Resources

Resources

This page is dedicated to all resources for researchers on defense topics in a multidisciplinary approach. We welcome any suggestion to improve it.

Books

Aben J. (1992), Economie politique de la défense, Editions Cujas, Paris.

Adams G. (1981), The Iron Triangle: The Politics of Defense Contracting, Council on Economic Priorities, New York.

Adelman K. et Augustine N. (1990), The Defense Revolution, Strategy for the Brave New World. Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, San Francisco.

Hartley K. et Sandler T. (eds) Handbook of Defense Economics, vol. 1 (1995 et 2 (2007), Elsevier, Amsterdam.

Asch, B.J., Heaton P., Hosek J., Martorell F., Simon C.J. et Warner J.T. (2010), Cash Incentives and Military Enlistment, Attrition, and Reenlistment, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica.

Asch, B.J., Heaton P. et Savych B. (2009). Recruiting Minorities: What Explains Recent Trends in the Army and Navy?, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica.

Augustine N. (1983), Augustine’s Laws: An irreverent guide to traps, puzzles and quandaries of the defense business and other complex undertakings, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, New York.

Bellais R. (2000), Production d’Armes et Puissance des Nations, L’Harmattan, Paris.

Benoit E. (1973), Defense and economic growth in developing countries, Lexington Books, Lexington (Massachusetts).

Cornes R. et Sandler T. (1996), The theory of externalities, public goods and club goods, 2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Hebert J.P. (1995), Production d’armement, Mutation du système français, La Documentation Française, Paris.

Herrera R. (1994), Les Données statistiques relatives aux dépenses militaires dans les pays en développement, OCDE, Paris.

Ikegami-Andersson M. (1992), The Military-Industrial Complex: The Cases of Sweden and Japan, Dartmouth, Aldershot.

Kaul I., Conceicao P., Le Goulven K. et Mendoza R. (2003) Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, Oxford University Press, New York.

Keller W.J. (1995), Arm in Arm: The Political Economy of the Global Arms Trade, Basic Books, New York.

Kirat T., Bayon D. et Blanc H. (2003), Maîtriser les coûts des programmes d’armement. Une analyse comparative de la réglementation des marchés industriels d’armement en France, au Royaume-Uni et aux États-Unis, La documentation française, Paris.

Markowski S., Hall P. et Wylie R. (2009), Defence Procurement and Industry Policy: A small country perspective, Routledge, Londres.

Martin S. (Ed., 1996). The Economics of Offsets: Defense Procurement and Countertrade, Harwood Academic Publishers.

Olson M. (1965), The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts).

Oudot J.M. (2010), Choix contractuels et performances. Le cas des contrats de défense. Editions Universitaires Européennes.

Peck M.J et Scherer F.M. (1962), The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis, Harvard University Press, Harvard.

Sandler T. et Hartley K. (1995), The Economics of Defense, Cambridge University Press, New York.

Scherer F.M. (1964), The Weapons acquisition Process: Economic Incentives, Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration, Boston.

Sheehan N. (2011), The Economics of UN Peacekeeping, Routledge, New-York.

Singer P.W. (2003), Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

Stiglitz J. et Bilmes L. (2008), The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict, W.W. Norton, New York.

Articles

Alpetekin A. et Levine P. (2012), “Military expenditure and economic growth: A meta-analysis”, European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 28, p. 636–650.

Asch B.J. et Warner J. (2001), “A theory of compensation and personnel policy in hierarchical organizations with application to the US military” Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 19, p. 523-562.

Atesoglu H.S. et Mueller M.J. (1990), “Defence spending and economic growth”, Defence Economics, vol. 2, p. 19-27.

Bellais R. et Guichard R. (2006), “Defense, Innovation, Technology Transfers and Public Policy in France”, Defense and Peace Economics, vol. 17, n°3, p. 273-286.

Bellais R. et Oudot J.M. (2009), “Le recours aux contrats de partenariat dans la défense en France”, Revue française d’administration publique, n°130, p. 263-274.

Benoit E. (1978), “Growth and defense in developing countries”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 26, p. 271-280.

Brauer J. (1999), An Economic Perspective on Mercenaries, Military Companies, and the Privatisation of Force, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 13, n°1, p.130-146.

Bromund T.R. (2009), “Contracting Out in Defense: Lessons from the British Experience for the U.S. and Great Britain”, Backgrounder, n°2278.

Coats R.M., Karahan G. et Tollison R.D. (2006), “Terrorism and Pork-Barrel Spending”, Public Choice, vol. 128, n°1-2, p. 275-287.

Daula T. et Moffit R. (1995), “Estimating dynamic models of quit behavior: The case of military reenlistment” Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 13, p. 449-523.

De Nevers R. (2010), “The Effectiveness of Self-Regulation by the Private Military and Security Industry”, Journal of Public Policy, vol. 30, n°2, p. 219-240.

Deger S. (1986), “Economic development and defense expenditure, Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 35, p. 179-196.

Dunne J.P., Smith R.P. et Willenbockel D. (2005), “Models of Military Expenditure and Growth: A Critical Review”, Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 16, n°6, p. 449-461.

Foucault M. (2006), “Europe de la Défense : quel processus d’allocation? ”, Revue Économique, vol. 57, n°3, p. 407-117.

Foucault M. (2012), “Les budgets de défense en France, entre déni et déclin”, Focus stratégique, n°36, IFRI, Paris.

Franck R. et Melese F. (2008), “Defense Acquisition: New Insights from Transaction Cost Economics”, Defense & Security Analysis, vol. 24, n°2, p.107-128.

Fredland J.E. (2004), “Outsourcing Military Force: A Transactions Cost Perspective on the Role of Military Companies”, Defence & Peace Economics, vol. 15, n°3, p. 205-219.

Gates W.R. et Terasawa K.L. (2003), “Reconsidering publicness in alliance defence expenditures: NATO expansion and burden sharing”, Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 14, n°5, p. 369-383.

Gold D. (1990), The impact of defense spending on investment, productivity and economic growth, Defense Budget Project, Washington.

Greer W.R. et Liao S.S. (1986), “An Analysis of Risk and Return in the Defense Market: Its Impact on Weapon System Competition”, Management Science, vol. 32, n°10, p. 1259-1273.

Guyot M. et Vranceanu R. (1997), “Quelle réglementation pour le secteur de la Défense : l’expérience américaine”, Revue française d’économie, vol. 12, n°3, p. 167-193

Hartley K. (2008), “The Industrial and Economic benefits of Eurofighter Typhoon”, Centre for Defence Economics, University of York, York.

Hartley K., Bellais R. et Hébert J.P. (2008), “The evolution and future of European defence firms”, in Chatterji M. et Fontanel J. (dir.), War, peace and security. Emerald, New York, p. 83-104.

Hewitt D. (1992), “Military Expenditures Worldwide: Determinants and Trends, 1972-1988”, Journal of Public Policy, vol. 12, p. 105-52.

Hiller J.R. et Tollison R.D. (1978), “Incentive versus Cost-Plus Contracts in Defense Procurement”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 26, n°3, p. 239-248.

Holmqvist C. (2005), Private Security Companies, The Case for Regulation, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 9, SIPRI, Stockholm.

Kapstein E.B. et Oudot J.M. (2009), “Reforming defense procurement: Lessons from France”, Business & Politics, n°11(2), article 1.

Khanna, J., Sandler T. etShimizu H. (1998), “Sharing the financial burden for UN and NATO peacekeeping: 1976-1996”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol.42, p. 176-95.

Kirat T. (2003), “L’allocation des risques dans les contrats : de l’économie des contrats ‘incomplets’ à la pratique des contrats administratifs”, Revue Internationale de Droit Economique, vol. 17, n°1, p. 11-46.

Kirkpatrick D.L.I. (1995), “The Rising Unit Costs of Defence Equipment – the Reasons and the Results”, Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 6, p. 263-288.

Kirkpatrick D.L.I. (2004), “Trends in the Costs of Weapon Systems and the Consequences”, Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 15, n°3, p. 259-273.

Kovacic W.E. (1991), “Commitment in Regulation: Defense Contracting and Extensions to Price Caps”, Journal of Regulatory Economics, vol. 3, n°3, p. 219-240.

Kurth J. (1972), “The Political Economy of Weapons Procurement”, American Economic Review, vol. 62, n°2, p. 304-311.

Lewis T. R. (1993), “Defense Procurement and the Theory of Agency”, in J. Leitzel et J. Tirole (eds), Incentives in Procurement Contracting. Westview Press, Boulder.

Malizard J. (2010), “Causality Between Economic Growth and Military Expenditure: The Case of France”, Defense & Security Analysis, vol. 26, n°4, p. 401-413.

MarkusenA.R. (2003), “The Case against Privatizing National Security”, Governance, n°16(4), p. 471-501.

Mbaku J.M. (1991), “Military Expenditures and Bureaucratic Competition for Rents”, Public Choice, Vol. 71, n°1-2, p. 19-31.

Mehay S. et Hogan P. (1998), “The effects of bonuses on voluntary quits: Evidence from the military’s downsizing” Southern Economic Journal, vol. 65, p. 127-139.

Murdoch J.C., Hansen L. et Sandler T. (1991), “An econometric technique for comparing median voter and oligarchy choice models of collective action: the case of the Nato Alliance”, Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 73, n°4, p. 624-631.

Oi W. (1967), “The economic cost of the draft”, American Economic Review, Vol. 52, n°2, p. 39-62.

Olson M. et Zeckhauser R. (1966), “An economic theory of alliances”, Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 48, n°3, p. 266-279.

Orvis B. et Asch B. (2001), Military recruiting: Trends, outlook, and implications (MR-902-A/OSD), RAND Corporation, Santa Monica.

Oudot J.M. (2007), “Choix du type de contrat et performance: le cas des marchés publics de défense”, Economie Publique, vol. 21, n°2, p. 157-182.

Oudot J.M. et Bellais R. (2008), “Choix contractuels et innovation : le cas de l’approvisionnement de défense”, Innovations, Cahiers d’économie de l’innovation, n°28, septembre, p. 85-103.

Oudot J.M. et Menard C. (2010), “Opportunisme ou équité ? Le cas des contrats d’approvisionnement de défense”, Revue française d’économie, vol. 24, n°3, p. 195-226.

Ram R. (1989), “Government size and economic growth: A new framework and some evidence from cross-section and time-series data: Reply”, American Economic Review, vol. 79, p. 281-284.

Renou X. (2005), La privatisation de la violence. Mercenaires et sociétés militaires privées au service du marché, Agone, Paris.

Rockoff H. (1998), “The Peace Dividend in Historical Perspective,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, vol. 88, n°2, p. 46–50.

Rogerson W.P. (1990), “Quality versus Quantity in Military Procurement”, American Economic Review, vol. 80, n°1, p. 83-92.

Rogerson W.P.(1994), “Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 8, n°4, p. 65-90.

Sandler T. (1977), “Impurity of defense: An application to the economics of alliance”, Kyklos, vol. 30, p. 443-460.

Sandler T. (1999), “Alliance formation, alliance expansion, and the core”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 43, n°6, p. 727-747.

Sandler T. et Cauley (1975), “On the Economic Theory of Alliances”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 19, n°2, p. 330-348.

Sandler T. et Forbes J.F. (1980), “Burden Sharing, strategy, and the design of NATO”, Economic Inquiry, vol. 18, n°3, p. 425-44.

Sandler T. et Hartley K. (2001), “Economics of alliances: the lessons for collective action”, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 39, p. 869-896.

Sandler T. et Murdoch J.C. (2000), “On sharing NATO defence burdens in the 1990s and beyond”, Fiscal Studies, vol. 21, n°3, p. 297-327.

Sandler T. et Tschirhart J.T. (1997), “The economic theory of clubs: Thirty years later”, Public Choice, vol. 93, n°3-4, p. 335-55.

Shearer D. (1998), “Outsourcing War”, Foreign Policy, n°112, p. 68-81.

Shieh J., Lai C. et Chang W. (2002), “The impact of military burden on long-run growth and welfare”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol.68, p.443–455.

Shimizu H. et Sandler T. (2010), “Recent peacekeeping burden sharing”, Applied Economics Letters, vol. 17, n°15, p. 1479-1484.

Simon C.J. et Warner J. (2010), “Army re-enlistment during OIF/OEF: Bonuses, deployment, and stop-loss”, Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 21, n°5-6, p. 507-527.

Singer P.W. (2001), “Corporate Warriors. The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and its Ramifications for International Security”, International Security, vol. 26, n°3, p. 186-220.

Sislin J. (1994), “Arms as Influence. The Determinants of Successful Influence”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 38, n°4, p. 665-689.

Smith D. et Smith R. (1980), “Military expenditures, resources and development”, Discussion Paper, n°87,University of London, Birkbeck College, Londres, novembre.

Smith R.P. et Tasiran A. (2005), “The demand for arms import”, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 42, p. 167-182.

Thies W. J. (1987), “Alliances and collective goods”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 31, p. 298-332.

van Ypersele de Strihou J. (1967), “Sharing the Defense Burden among Western Allies », Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 49, n°4, p. 527-36.

Warner J. et Asch B. (1996), “The economic theory of conscription reconsidered”, Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 7, p. 297-312.

Warner J. et Asch B. (2001), “The record and prospects of the all-volunteer military in the United States”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 15, p. 169-192.

Warner J. et Negrusa S. (2005), “Evasion costs and the theory of conscription”, Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 16, p. 83-100.

Warner J. et Simon C.J. (2009), “The Supply Price of Commitment: Evidence From The Air Force Enlistment Bonus Program”, Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 20, n°4, p. 269-286.

Williamson O.E. (1967), “The Economics of Defense Contracting: Incentives and Performance”, in McKean (dir.), Issues in Defense Economics, Columbia University Press, New-York, p. 217-256.